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The recent publication of Martin Holbraad and Morten Pedersen’s The Ontological Turn: An 
Anthropological Exposition (2017) offers an opportunity to assess what has happened to a 
particular version of (what is now rather loosely known as) anthropology’s ‘ontological turn’. 
Coming out ten years after Thinking Through Things  (Henare, Holbraad, & Wastell, 2007), 
the authors of The Ontological Turn deliberately invite a comparison between these two 
publications in their ‘hope’ that the new book ‘might help move the debate … away from the 
divisive and earth-scorching manner characteristic of the “first generation”  discussions 
about ontology within anthropology, including some of our own writings’ (2017:xi). A lot has 
happened in the ten years between these two books. Different kinds of ‘ontological turns’ 
have emerged and the word ‘ontology’ has become so prevalent that there is a risk of it 
being watered-down, as often happens when new(-ish) theoretical terms come into 
everyday academic usage. The second book usefully sets itself in conversation with these 
‘other ontological turns’. Yet, its main purpose is to present its own version of ‘the 
ontological turn’ and to engage with critiques of what was first proposed in the introduction 
to Thinking Through Things, in order to clarify and refine what many consider a foundational 
text in this particular kind of anthropology. Love it or hate it, it is hard to overstate the 
splash made by Thinking Through Things in 2007, especially by the prospectus for 
anthropology outlined in its introduction. It provoked strong debates and strong emotions. 
This Bookmark asks: what happened to these core arguments first aired in Thinking Through 
Things (TTT) between its publication in 2007 and that of its younger modified sibling The 
Ontological Turn (TOT), a decade later?  
 Before turning to what TOT does or does not do with the arguments and legacy of 
TTT, let us briefly consider the form, shape, and content of the two books. TOT is a co-
authored book consisting of six chapters, topped and tailed by a short introduction and an 
even shorter conclusion. Its introduction outlines the ‘anthropological exposition’ of the 
particular ontological approach that the authors are concerned with. This is where they 
engage with, refine and move beyond some of the critiques leveled at the introduction to 
TTT. It is followed by a useful chapter positioning their ‘ontological turn’ (they do call it ‘our 
ontological turn’) in relation to ‘other ontological turns’, which they group into four 
categories: ‘Philosophy’ (e.g. ‘Object-Orientated Ontology’ [Bogost 2012] and speculative 
realism [Harman 2010, Meillassoux 2008]); ‘Science and Technology Studies’ (Latour 1999, 
2005); ‘Alternative Ontology’ (Evans 2008, Ingold 2000, Kohn 2015); and ‘Deep Ontologies’ 
(Scott 2007; Descola 2013). This is followed by three chapters outlining the contributions of 
three anthropologists whose interventions the authors identify as foundational to their own 
ontological turn: Roy Wagner, Marilyn Strathern and Eduardo Viveiros de Castro. The last 
two chapters revisit the authors’ own earlier works – including Holbraad’s Cuban 
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powder/power conundrum, first aired in TTT -  in order to illustrate what ‘their’ ontological 
turn looks like through some ‘real’ ethnography. The conclusion that follows engages in a 
brief discussion of ‘post-critical anthropology’ and ‘the politics of ontology’.  
TTT is a different kind of book, which emerged out of an earlier context. An edited 
collection, it brings eight ethnographic case studies together under the banner of its 
directional introduction. While TTT’s introduction is undoubtedly part of the historical 
context for TOT’s publication in 2017,  the chapters TTT drew together in 2007 spoke more 
directly to debates around ‘material culture’, ‘materiality’ and ‘object agency’ emergent in 
the early 2000s, in the wake of decisive interventions by Alfred Gell (1998),  Bruno Latour 
(1999; 2005) and others (Ingold 2000;  Miller 2005). These debates were all concerned with 
overcoming Cartesian dualities, particularly the nature/culture, object/subject, mind/body 
distinctions, from which all anthropological sins still often seem to derive (cf. Ecks 2009). 
TTT’s introduction, however, used the context of these discussions about ‘materiality’ to 
launch its own ambitious proposal for what an ‘artifact-orientated anthropology’ might look 
like, ‘if it were not about material culture’ (2007:I). While other ‘materiality’ approaches 
were concerned with questions of how objects and things do things, in order to disrupt 
conventional relationships between people and things through notions like ‘object agency’, 
‘affordances and effectivities’, ‘networks of hybrid actants’, and so on, the core proposal of 
TTT’s introduction was to collapse the distinction between ‘meaning’ and ‘matter’ by using 
things encountered ethnographically to do conceptual work. That is, to challenge deep 
anthropological assumptions and open up possibilities for conceptual creativity, and even 
‘emancipation’. Key to this endeavor was a disavowal of the notion of ‘material culture’, as 
this, it was suggested, already assumed a world divided between the cultural and the 
material – meaning and matter. Understandably, this suggestion irked some scholars 
working within a ‘material culture’ framework, who had long struggled against its 
marginalisation as a specialist interest within the discipline,1 even if it is clear that what TTT 
was proposing was a significant move beyond the notion of ‘subjects creating objects 
creating subjects’ which continues to hold some sway in this field (Miller 2005).  
The more modest aim of TTT’s introduction, of using things encountered 
ethnographically to critique deeply held Cartesian assumptions, was carried through the 
book’s more ethnographic chapters. The question remains, however, to what extent the 
forceful proposition for concept creation, ‘ontological emancipation’, ‘radical difference’ and 
‘multiple ontologies’, as set out in the introduction of TTT, was reflected in its chapters. 
Some of these case-studies seemed more aligned with questions pre-occupying the wider 
materiality debates than the book’s introduction. This is most obvious in Leach’s chapter in 
TTT, which utilized ethnographic experiences of collaborations between artists and scientists 
to critique Gell’s ideas about the deferred, distributed agency of people acting through 
things. It is also clear in Reed’s chapter,  ‘Smuk is king’ which explored what cigarettes do in 
a Papua New Guinea prison, pointing to how  ‘the material properties of things can become 
involved in the production of meaning’ (2007:42). Likewise, chapters by Empson and 
Pedersen, both on Mongolia, examined how relations and socialities are constituted through 
things. Empson explores how Mongols nurture xishig (‘fortune’) and different kinship 
relations by making them visible or invisible in the ways that things are contained within, or 
displayed on top of, household chests. Her conclusion (citing Humphrey 2002:83),  that the 
‘display of these relations in households brings to the fore some of the ways in which objects 
and people are mutually constituted by processes of objectification’ (2007:135), clearly 
echoed prominent themes of the wider ‘materiality debates’. Although Pedersen’s 
discussion of Darhad shamanism also explored how certain things (particularly ritual regalia) 
enable different social relations to be constituted, his argument pushed further in the 
direction of TTT’S introduction in its exploration of the possibility of other, non-
representational ways of knowing that can emerge from the different states of being that 
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these costumes enable shamans to achieve. Alongside this chapter, Holbraad’s now well-
known assertion (in that volume, and again in chapter 5 in TOT) about Cuban diviners’ 
powder being power rather than representing it, and Moutu’s insistence (chapter 5) upon 
the separation of ‘an epistemological attitude’ from ‘a pre-reflexive analysis’ in order that 
‘collections may be apprehended as a way of being’ (2007:108) all spoke more to the 
propositions developed in TTT’s introduction.  
Henare’s chapter in TTT looked at a particular ‘cultural property’ claim by Maori in 
New Zealand in order to explore commensurability between ‘European’ notions of property 
rights and commodities, and the Maori concept of taonga (as first discussed in Mauss’s The 
Gift, a firm favorite in this genre). She suggested that we can no longer assume ‘that the 
effects of colonisation necessarily adulterate or demolish distinctive concepts, producing 
ontological hybrids…’. Rather we should ‘acknowledge positions that may be wholly Maori 
and also European’. Henare argued that this is itself part of the ‘creativity of taonga’, that is 
derived ‘from a fabric of relations peopled both by objects that appear as people, and by 
people that appear as things’ (2007: 64). In another chapter, Wastell reached a not dissimilar 
conclusion in relation to legal cases about the limits of monarchical rule in Swaziland (24). 
The point here was not that Swaziland lawyers are incapable of moving ‘between two 
seemingly incommensurable conceptualisations of power’ embodied by ‘the rule of law’ and 
‘divine kingship’. After all, ‘one does not contradict the other’. Rather their ability to move 
between the two is itself ‘an index of the ontological alterity of kingship’, highlighting the 
conceptual limitations of academic notions of ‘sovereignty’,  but also of res judicata – ‘the 
authority to declare something as truth’ – in a context where ‘truth is something else 
altogether’ and  ‘constituted by the power/essence in which one participates’ (2007:87-8). In 
both these cases it was not very clear to what extent the arguments presented supported 
the proposals for ‘concept creation’ , ‘radical difference’ and ‘ontological emancipation’ put 
forward in the volume’s introduction. 
The extent to which TTT’s chapters spoke to the ontological turn espoused in its 
introduction therefore remains uneven and somewhat unresolved. However, the case 
studies were well received and have appeared on many university reading lists, leading 
some to suggest that TTT’s real value lay here, rather than in its introduction. It is also 
unclear to what extent the authors of these other chapters necessarily supported the self-
ascribed, more ‘radical’ claims of TTT’s introduction – about the distinction between 
‘epistemology’ and ‘ontology’, and the emancipatory potential of ‘radical differences’, ‘other 
worlds’ and ‘multiple ontologies’, which many later perceived as dangerously essentialising 
and not a little conceited (Werbner 2008; Fontein 2011; Graeber 2015; Geschiere 2009). 
Whatever the level of agreement between TTT’s introduction and its constituent chapters, it 
was the ‘ontological turn’ prescribed in that introduction that generated the controversies 
that followed the book’s publication; and it is those claims which Holbraad and Pedersen’s 
book, a decade later, seeks to clarify, modify and refine.  
The criticisms and debates that TTT’s introduction provoked – especially those held 
at Manchester in 2008 (Carrithers et al. 2008) and at the American Anthropological 
Association meeting in 2014 - generated  much anticipation for the publication of The 
Ontological Turn a decade later, so it is worth considering them in a bit more detail. TTT 
caused something of a stir across anthropological circles, inciting equal measures of 
infuriation, frustration and concern, as well as celebration, inspiration and sometimes 
obsequious admiration. These mixed responses were provoked in part by the self-
proclaimed ‘radical’ nature of what was being prescribed, and by some of the more worrying 
implications, or side effects, of the medicine being administered. As Laidlaw has noted 
(2017:396), turning the study of epistemology into something akin to a human rights abuse, 
certainly riled many people. It is therefore instructive to note that even TOT’s  authors admit 
that Strathern, who they cite as one of three foundational thinkers influencing their 
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'ontological turn’, remains committed to anthropology as an epistemological project, and 
has kept a polite distance from anything ontological. Some argued that TTT's introduction 
surreptitiously transformed ‘ontology’ and ‘epistemology’ from referring to discussions 
about ‘the nature of being’ and ‘of knowledge’, respectively, into simply the ‘way of being’ 
and ‘knowledge about the world’ (Graeber 2015:15). Others highlighted the practical 
problems of distinguishing ontology from epistemology in ethnographic encounters, and the 
worrying assumption that this seemed to carry, that only the anthropologist is (self-) 
conscious enough to be able to distinguish between them, or between different 'ontologies' 
as such (Fontein 2011; Werbner 2008). The move from ‘epistemology’ to ‘ontology’ was 
framed in TTT‘s introduction as a move from 'other worldviews' to 'other worlds', and was 
explicitly prescribed as an attempt to move away from the 'modernist' and Eurocentric 
nature/culture distinction (that there is a single ‘natural’ world upon which variation is 
culturally imposed; that is, multiple world-views), in order to enable the 'ontological self-
determination of the worlds peoples' (Viveiros de Castro 2003:19);  that is,  to recognize 
‘other worlds’.  
This provoked other criticisms ranging in seriousness from the mild accusation that 
the kind of 'ontology' being prescribed was really just 'another word for culture' (Carrithers 
et al. 2008), to anxieties about its deeply conservative reification of 'radical alterity' (Graeber 
2015) and its essentialisation of difference that seemed to hark back to another era of 
'anthropological othering' long exposed for the nefarious politics (colonialism, segregation, 
apartheid etc.) it enabled. As Graeber pointed out, this was explicit in some articulations of 
this particular ‘ontological turn’; as in, for example, Holbraad’s comments about how the 
‘ontological turn … protects our “science” and our “common sense” as much as it protects 
the “native.”’ (Holbraad in Alberti, Fowles, Holbraad, Marshall, and Witmore 2011: 903, 
cited in Graeber 2015:7). Despite such lackadaisical comments, some of these criticisms 
probably did not reflect TTT’s authors' intentions (see Holbraad & Pedersen 2017:176). But 
the fact that this was what many scholars read into TTT is enough to demonstrate that a 
second, clarifying book was much needed. Conversely, for TTT’s admirers it was exactly the 
possibility of ‘radical alterity’ accessible only through ontologically-inclined ethnography 
which fired so much fervor for this particular version of the ‘ontological turn’.   
 But it was not just the 'content' of the TTT prescription that fuelled the odd mixture 
of irritation and/or admiration it provoked. It was also the proselytizing zeal with which it 
was presented and its super-abstraction (mimicking Strathernian style), making even the 
most educationally-privileged scratch their heads in bewilderment. Furthermore, the fact 
that ethnographically derived concepts seemed to suddenly matter much more than 
ethnographically encountered people, or any people at all, let alone things and materials 
(Ingold 2007), all undermined the emancipatory zeal with which this particular ontological 
prescription was  delivered. The final straw for many was that, all too often, the examples 
put forward to illustrate what good ontologically-informed anthropology might look like, 
seemed simply to resemble good anthropological analysis of rich ethnographic material. 
Hence, the frequent comment that TTT's real strength lay in its other, more ethnographic, 
chapters. For many, using ethnographically-encountered ideas (or ‘concepts’, if you must) 
about how ‘the world’, ‘worlds’, or ‘world-views’ operate,  in order to challenge, 
reconfigure, re-invent (Wagner) anthropological frameworks, knowledge regimes, or 
‘concepts’ for apprehending or making sense of those worlds/worldviews, is exactly what 
anthropology has always been about. Those 'a-ha' moments that give ethnographic 
fieldwork and anthropology its joie de vivre - and which TOT’s  authors make such a point of 
celebrating (2017: 1-3) - are not the exclusive preserve of ‘ontographers’, or those otherwise 
ontologically-inclined. We all have them. That is why many of us do anthropology.  
 I suspect that all of the above factors fed into the anticipation that preceded TOT: 
the desire for more clarity about what exactly is (and what is not) being prescribed as this 
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version of the 'ontological turn', to make it teachable, if nothing else. Where did it come 
from? Why does it matter? And would it be possible to deliver the  prescription without 
alienating swathes of anthropological colleagues working on related or very different 
projects; or more importantly, people at large, not to mention things, materials and stuff? 
Furthermore, could this be productively and historically situated in conversation with a 
broader range of other intellectual endeavors, including both older anthropological 
approaches and those 'newish' ones that together we might think of as post-
postmodernism? In other words, does TOT avoid the problems its elder sibling instigated, 
and does it do justice to the anticipation that long preceded its publication?  
The very briefest answer here is simply yes. In significant ways this book is an 
important improvement, clarification and refinement of the main arguments proposed in 
TTT's introduction, and it does a much better job of outlining what the authors see as the 
purpose and mechanisms of the particular ontological turn they are prescribing. It is, 
without doubt, immensely clever, well written and on the whole coherent. It is also useful. 
The three chapters outlining the influence of Wagner, Strathern and Viveiros de Castro on 
the thinking behind their 'ontological turn', are incredibly thorough, even if sometimes these 
thinkers’ approaches are stretched and twisted a little to fit the schema being presented. 
They are too comprehensive to do justice to here. Suffice to say that they will be of great 
use to anthropologists, particularly those condemned to teaching this super-abstract stuff to 
undergraduates, by outlining some of the historical context from which this brand of 
‘ontological turn’ emerged.  
 Beyond articulating where it came from, however, TOT also presents some 
significant modifications to the arguments outlined in TTT’s introduction, which will likely 
appeal to scholars willing to take the larger arguments at stake here seriously, but who 
found the elder sibling too ill-refined to swallow whole. All talk of 'other worlds' and 
‘multiple ontologies’ is now out, identified as ‘preposterously reifying’ (2017:176). Similarly 
the over-emphasis on distinguishing epistemology from ontology is transformed into ‘a 
methodological project that poses ontological questions to solve epistemological problems’ 
(2017:5), even as ‘it so happens that epistemology in anthropology has to be about ontology 
too’ (2017:X). Moreover, as the whole project’s purpose is relegated to the methodological, 
rather than doing ontology per se, there is a rejection of ontology as a noun, especially in 
the plural (no more ontologies). We don’t do ‘ontology’, what we do is 'ontological', goes 
the repetitive refrain. The point is therefore decidedly not to say anything about the world 
(or worlds) - whether real, really real, or really imagined - but rather to use ethnographic 
encounters to do 'concept creation', to conjure up possibilities for what could be; what I 
think of as the anthropology of the subjunctive, to which I return below. In TOT’s authors' 
own words, the ontological turn is now, rather straightforwardly: 
 
about allowing the object of ethnographic analysis to have a transformative effect on the 
ontological assumptions the anthropologist brings to it, and in that way contribute to setting 
the terms of the anthropologist’s conceptualisation and analysis of it (2017: 68).  
 
This sounds much closer to the second (and for many, more palatable) of ‘two quite 
different conceptions of what anthropology is ultimately about’ that Graeber (2015: 6) 
identified in his correspondence with Viveiros de Castro about ‘ontology’ and ‘radical 
alterity’. That is:  not to ‘unsettle our categories’ in order to ‘better understand the “radical 
alterity” of a specific  group of people’, but rather to ‘show that … such alterity was not quite 
as radical as we thought’, and to ‘put those apparently exotic concepts to work to reexamine 
our own everyday assumptions and to say something new about human beings in general’. 
Graeber (2015:6) identifies this second definition as the core anthropological purpose 
behind so-called ‘ethnographic theory’, as championed by the journal HAU, which has 
sometimes been seen as promoting a more moderate version of the prescription offered in 
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TTT’s introduction. Indeed, phrased like this, it is hard to disagree with the broad intentions 
of what is being suggested in TOT. Many anthropologists will again say that this is, more or 
less, what they thought they had been doing all along, and for a very long time. Indeed the 
authors hardly deny this, acknowledging several times the long histories to which their turn 
belongs, predating their particular obsession/fascination with Wagner, Strathern and 
Viveiros de Castro. In their own words, ‘there is nothing radically new about the ontological 
turn with respect to the three abiding modes of anthropological thought we have singled 
out’ (2017:21). These ‘modes of anthropological thought’ are ‘reflexivity, conceptualisation 
and experimentation’ (2017:9). But as there is nothing inherently new here, what is really 
being suggested is a ‘deepening’, extending’, ‘radicalisation’, and ‘intensification’ of these 
‘existing but partly dormant potentials in the anthropological project’ (2017:9). The over-
emphasis on ‘conceptualisation’ will likely continue to rub some people the wrong way, but 
overall, all of this does mark a significant climb down from the more extreme aspects of 
TTT’S prescription. And yet, if this does appease many of the critics, it will also be a 
disappointment to those whose energies were fired up by the possibilities that ‘radical 
alterity’ and ‘other worlds’ offered. Many more will likely wonder what all the fuss was 
about.  
I do wonder though if something is lost in the retreat that TOT makes from TTT’s 
more ambitious claims. There seems to be a lack of courage here that amounts to a kind of 
conceit in the determination not to say anything about the ‘really real’. Are anthropological 
ideas about the world really so important and efficacious that we should not risk saying 
anything about the ‘really real’ at all? Or, more precisely, just confine ourselves to the task 
of ‘providing the conceptualisations that are needed to render ethnographic descriptions 
and anthropological comparisons fully articulate’ (2017:18). Not only does this position 
again place the anthropologist in a peculiarly privileged position – we need anthropologists 
to fully realize the conceptual potential that lies in other ways of making/sensing the world - 
it also implies that what we say and do matters so much that we really should not risk 
getting it wrong by making some incorrect metaphysical claim. But why not get it wrong? 
Why does it matter? The authors talk about the need for conceptual experimentation and 
acknowledge that many ‘ontologically informed anthropological analyses are likely to “fail” ’ 
(2017:22), so why the hesitation to make metaphysical claims? What are the stakes here? 
And whose stakes are they? No one will lose their job (or anything else) because they have 
made some contingent claim about the world. And how does all of this tally with the original 
motivations said to have lain behind the whole exercise: fatigue with the defeatism of 
anthropology’s ‘crisis of representation’, and the desire to turn away from phenomenology’s 
‘aversion to concepts’ (2017:282, 284)?  
Conversely, in my reading of this book, I increasingly got the sense that there is 
something a little bit metaphysical going on here; something that possibly borrows more 
from phenomenology than the authors would care to admit and which does come close to 
an idea of the ‘really real’, despite the authors' declaration that their (revised) ontological 
turn  is ‘decidedly not concerned with what the “really real” nature of the world is, or any 
similar metaphysical quest’ (2017:5). See for example: 
 
The point is not to keep looking for new alternatives to what the world is like. Rather it is to 
find ways to allow the world, as it expresses itself in the contingent ethnographic situations 
that we encounter as anthropologists, to show us how things could be otherwise. Posing 
ethnography as a conduit for metaphysical contingency, anthropology turns to ontological 
questions without taking any single ‘ontology’ as an answer  - its ultimate concern being not 
with what is, but with what could be. (2017:68) 
 
As I read and re-read I found myself wondering whether this emphasis on ‘metaphysical 
contingency’, on what could be - or as I prefer, an anthropology of the subjunctive2  - might  
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itself amount to a kind of ontological claim about profound uncertainty, contingency and 
indeterminacy. For example, ‘instead of closing off the horizon of reflexivity in the name of 
some sort of ultimate reality’, we are told ‘the ontological turn is the methodological 
injunction to keep this horizon perpetually open’ (2017:11). If taken as an ontological claim 
about the un-knowability of the world, such a claim would tally with the Deleuzian ideas of 
emergence and becoming that are threaded throughout the book, and which have had a 
disproportionate influence on much recent anthropological writing (Laidlaw 2017:398; 
Bialecki 2018). As well as engaging with an increasingly central concern in anthropology 
(Cooper & Pratten 2015) and perhaps sociology (see Rosa 2018 & 2019 on ‘resonance’ and 
‘unpredictability’), this could also incorporate the excessive potentialities (Pinney 2005) of 
the properties of materials (including, but not at all limited to, their ‘conceptual 
affordances’), the absence of which, the authors acknowledge (following Ingold, 2007), was 
a significant weakness of TTT’s earlier proposal to think through things (2017: chapter 5). It 
might also provide an opportunity to engage with postcolonial work being done elsewhere  
(not just Amazonia, Papua New Guinea or Mongolia), by scholars like Francis Nyamnjoh 
(2017b:253; also 2017a), who explores notions of ‘incompleteness’ through the work of the 
Nigerian writer Amos Tutuola in order to critique ‘colonial and apartheid ideologies on being 
human and being African’, by exploring ‘conviviality, interconnections and interdependence 
between competing knowledge traditions’ in Africa’ and elsewhere. I suspect such an 
‘ontology of uncertainty’ would also have much to say to Graeber’s notion of ‘ontological 
realism and theoretical relativism’: that is ‘the development of a rich diversity of (at least 
partly) incommensurable theoretical perspectives on a reality that, I believe, can never be 
entirely encompassed by any one of them—for the very reason that it is real’ (2015:31). 
What would happen if such ‘uncertainty’, ‘indeterminacy’, ‘incompleteness’ or 
‘metaphysical contingency’, was put forward, or perhaps acknowledged, (contingently, of 
course, but also productively) as an ontological statement about how the world really is? I 
think many might welcome such a move because of the new analytical possibilities that it 
opens up. Such recognition of an  ‘ontology of uncertainty’, or of ‘ontological uncertainty’, 
might also open up possibilities for reconstituting a new kind of humanism (Wentzer & 
Mattingly 2018; Ingold 2018; Mattingly 2018; Jackson 2018; Throop 2018), as a political 
project as much as an intellectual one (Mbembe 2017: 179-185), working to level all 
people(s) (and animals and things if desired) in and with the world in a shared, open-ended 
project of contingent, emergent, ‘convivial’ and ‘interdependent’ (Nyamnjoh 2017a & 
2017b) knowledge production and collaborative understanding. As unease about the 
political consequences of so-called ‘posthumanism’ grows (see Ecks 2009), particularly in a 
world witnessing deepening, and widening  xenophobia, exclusion, ‘nativism’ and rising 
right-wing nationalism across many diverse contexts, this may well gain wider political 
traction beyond the discipline than relentlessly pushing for ‘ontological self-realization’. It 
suffices to say that, I suspect, many people will read an underlying ontology of uncertainty 
and contingency in what is written in TOT  - or the possibility for such - and find that to be an 
exciting proposition, if only the authors could acknowledge it. At the very least, many 
anthropologists will feel that making contingent claims about what the ‘really real’ world 
might really be like is still a productive and valuable thing to do, as long as all the necessary 
critical precautions (reflexivity etc.) are properly adhered to. Others will lament the sharp 
drop in critical ambition that TTT’s sibling seems to espouse.  
 So in many ways TOT is a marked improvement on the TTT, and yet, I suspect many 
readers will remain a bit ambivalent in their verdict. Indeed, there is something slightly 
ambivalent about the text, which has nothing to do with its dual authorship. As a 
collaborative writing project it is remarkably cohesive. Rather, the ambivalence reflects 
tensions within what TOT is trying to achieve. The authors often seem at pains to emphasize 
the moderate nature of their quest. This is at once a harking back to TTT with its emphasis 
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on the ‘humility ’ of the ontological approach3 - letting things speak for themselves - but also 
reflects the significant withdrawals this new rendering makes from TTT’s more outlandish 
claims, discussed above. And yet despite this will to the moderate, much of TTT’s irritating 
aesthetics are carried through to TOT: the proselytizing zeal; the occasionally patronizing 
tone; the super-abstraction when shorter more obvious analytical routes to the same ends 
are easily available; and the obsequious fawning over its three identified (even if not entirely 
accommodating) progenitors. Perhaps most of all, TOT retains a sense of clique-ness, which 
is particularly evident in a tendency to brush off, sometimes disdainfully, others’ efforts to 
deal with the same big shared problem at hand – how to move on from the dead-end that 
anthropology’s ‘crisis of representation’ and the postmodern turn had led the discipline to. 
The success of Hau (the journal and its various ancillaries) since its inception in 2011 is 
indicative here: suggesting wide support for the broader project of ‘ethnographic theory’ 
(but see Ingold  2014), even as recent revelations about Hau operations point, at least partly 
(aside from the specific allegations of misconduct also aired) to similar problems of privilege 
and clique-ness at stake here (see Dunn 2018). The discussion (chapter one) in which TOT’s 
authors situate ‘their’ ontological turn in relation to four other ‘ontological’ approaches 
(philosophy, science and technology studies, ‘alternative ontology approaches’, and ‘deep 
ontologies’) is also telling. While useful, this schema is also partial; I doubt all the authors 
categorised here would be comfortable with their designated associations. There is an 
uneasy sense that this four–way division was produced mainly to cast an unquestionable 
halo over the particular version to which TOT’s  authors are devoted. Many readers might 
consider more convincing a division between different ‘post-postmodern’ approaches which 
appears later (2017: 282), between phenomenological and ontological turns, and find 
themselves more easily aligned with the ‘aversion to concepts’ that the former embodies 
and the later eschews. I certainly found myself more drawn to some of the other thinkers 
described here, than to the (revised) ontological turn being outlined.  
 At the risk of sounding ‘alt–modisch’, I sometimes think about change in 
anthropology as being down to a continuum between two different forces inherent within 
the discipline, which we could call centripetal and centrifugal. Centripetal forces – as I think 
of them - are those tending towards an ever-more refined, minute and exclusivist idea of 
what anthropology should be; drawing a limited range of influences into an ever-more 
tightly-bounded, imagined core of concern.4 Centrifugal forces, on the other hand, are less 
concerned with isolating an 'essential' disciplinary core, or in championing a small, elite 
(usually male and white, but not always) group of ancestral progenitors, and looks instead 
outwards, to other thinkers, disciplines, ideas, encounters, and experiences (including 
ethnographic), for inspiration and new anthropological possibilities. Here anthropology 
changes because of its engagement with something(s) from ‘outside’, which includes 
(without being limited to) ‘the field’, however defined (Ingold 2014). Of course, we could all 
take either approach in our work, or be deemed to do so by others, but my problem is that it 
is not clear where the ‘ontological turn’, as initially proposed by TTT then toned down for 
TOT, lies on my imaginary centripetal-centrifugal continuum. At best, I suppose, it lies firmly 
at the centrifugal end. The call to take ethnographic ‘concepts’ seriously to enable a 
profound reshaping of anthropological thinking, suggests an openness to other possibilities, 
other ‘could be’s; or perhaps, subjunctive anthropology. Likewise, TOT’s overdue 
engagement with Ingold’s critique of ‘materiality’ in favor of materials (2007) suggests 
recognition of the need to attune to material ‘affordances’,  alongside those derived from 
ethnographic encounters with alterity. Indeed, this revised ontological turn could be 
profoundly sensitive to the conceptual possibilities that emerge from all kinds of ‘alterity’: 
ethnographic, material or otherwise. As such, it might epitomize anthropological 
‘centrifugal-ism’ at its best. Here anthropology changes because of something from ‘the 
outside’ – whether understood as encounters with ‘other worlds’, ‘worldviews’, ‘radical 
 9 
alterity’ or ‘just reality’ (Graeber 2015); or from the ‘educational correspondences of real 
life’  in an  ‘undivided, interstitial field of anthropology’ (Ingold 2014:313). This is humility 
and moderation at its (conceptual) best. It is also where the three political promises of this 
ontological turn’s  ‘anti-normative’ stance  find their grounding: ‘first to subjunctively 
present alternatives to declarations about what “is” or … “should be”’; secondly, when ‘the 
politics of ontology’ is ‘aligned deliberately with the politics of the peoples who occasion it’ 
(2017:294-5), as championed by Viveiros de Castro (2003); and thirdly, through the ‘kind of 
politics … immanent to the ontological turn’ itself, that is ‘the politics of indefinitely 
sustaining the possible, the “could be”’ (2017:297). 
And yet a distinct ‘centripetal-ism’ does flavor TOT; not least in the sometimes 
patronizing, often proselytizing, tones of its writing, and its super-abstractions and over-
intellectualisations. All this rings the Strathernian bell loudly, but  it will likely exclude many, 
and do little to convince skeptics of the project’s emancipatory potential, particularly in the 
context of growing calls to ‘decolonise the academy’. These are calls that this kind of 
anthropology should resonate with (such claims are made by some of its protagonists), if 
only it didn’t limit its appeal to such a small (often privileged) clique of thinkers through its 
inhospitable  abstractions and self-referential style, as if anthropology was not already an 
exclusive-enough club of highly specialized intellectuals. This ‘centripetal’ exclusivity is 
further reflected by the inclusion of two whole chapters (5 & 6) in TOT re-assessing the 
authors’ own chapters in the elder sibling TTT, rather than engaging with the myriad of 
ontologically-inclined works produced by other thinkers, some of which are listed (2017:8) 
but never discussed.  
Do not get me wrong: both these chapters do something important in the book. 
Both demonstrate good anthropological analysis, and if this quality reflects this particular 
‘ontological turn’ (and not just what good anthropology has always looked like) then they do 
float that boat with appropriate majesty. Chapter 5 reconciles the core ontological 
prescription to take things seriously with the important critique that to do so one must look 
at what their material properties offer. Therefore, even if ‘Afro-Cuban powder and 
Mongolian shamanic artifacts …  do not demonstrate that things can dictate the terms of 
their own conceptualizations entirely of their own accord’,  analysis of them should ‘involve 
an irreducible thing-driven component, or phase’ (2017:239). This is an important nod to not 
only Ingold’s (2007) stress on materials, but also Pinney’s insistence on the ‘alterity (or 
“torque”) of materiality that can never be assimilated to a disembodied “linguistic-
philosophical closure”, “culture” or “history”’ (2005:270). For its part, Chapter 6 engages 
with recent critiques of the ‘undue dominance of the “Melanesian Model of Sociality’” and 
its ‘relational analytics’ within recent anthropology. Conscious that such notions of 
‘relationality’ were ‘central to the … anthropological thought that  … developed into the 
[read our] ontological turn’ (2017:242), TOT’s authors are keen to explore what  a ‘post-
relational move’ might ‘look like’. But rather than engage seriously with alternatives 
suggested by critics of the ‘New Melanesian Ethnography’ (e.g. Scott 2014:50), they fall back 
on their own ‘impetus towards radically reflexive conceptual experimentation’ (2017:244),  
suggesting that: 
 
to ask what comes after the relation means intensifying the relational analytics associated 
with the ontological turn by experientially exposing the concept of ‘the relation’ and the 
analytical methods founded upon it, to ethnographic phenomena that have not hitherto 
been the subject of this approach – phenomena, that is to say, which may have been 
designated as ‘apparently non-relational’. (2017:244) 
 
It is hard to escape the self-referential circularity here; even if they do offer useful examples 
of how an ontologically-inclined anthropology can provide fruitful insights into Christian 
conversion – particularly how through conversion external social relations are turned 
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inwards and transformed into emotions like doubt and uncertainty. Again much of this is 
just good anthropology, yet this  much self-reflection/reassessment – two out of six chapters  
- not only looks defensive, it reiterates the sense that the ontological turn is only the 
preserve of a small elite cabal. Not drawing on similar ontologically-inspired work  from a 
wider pool of anthropologists, subject matter, and geographical regions (beyond Amazonia, 
Melanesia and Mongolia) is a presentational and political error that does their cause little 
good. They could, for example, have engaged with Sanders’s (2008) Beyond Bodies, on rain-
making and gender in Tanzania, which has produced its own critiques (Geschiere 2009). It’s 
not that the authors’ conviction that ‘their ontological turn’ should be applicable to any 
ethnographic subject or region, is unclear or unconvincing. But they should have 
demonstrated it and not simply stated it. The failure to do so undermines their cause. 
In conclusion, it is hard to deny that anthropology has been enriched by the 
contributions that TTT and its reforming sibling TOT have made - offering a glimpse at what 
is made possible by being conceptually open to the subjunctive possibilities derived from 
taking ethnography and things (i.e. the world in all of its excessive potentialities) seriously. 
Yet anthropology would also be impoverished if this ontological ‘methodology’ was 
prescribed as THE only thing that anthropology should be. The authors are careful not to 
make this claim. Yet the barely-restrained proselytizing zeal and the ‘centripetal’, self-
referential circularity of much of the writing, suggests it might be what they would wish. I 
suspect that the particular ontological turn being prescribed shares much more with other 
‘ontological’, ‘relational’ and ‘phenomenological’ approaches than the authors care to 
admit. The possibility, discussed above, that there is a shared ontology of uncertainty and 
contingency at play here, is one example of this. Many such approaches do seem influenced 
by Deleuzean thought, even if they don’t buy into  the ‘epoch-spanning periodization’ and 
‘social-evolutionism’ of the larger ‘system’ he proposed (Bialecki 2018:13). Maybe in 
decades to come anthropology’s various ‘ontological’ and ‘materiality’ turns will all be 
recognized under a single Deleuzean banner, as indeed Foucault himself once quipped 
(1998: 343, cited in Bialecki 2018: 13). Certainly all of these approaches – including ‘their’ 
ontological turn -  are part of a broader Zeitgeist, and will historically be judged as such. The 
authors allude to this possibility themselves, but apparently anxious to preserve the 
uniqueness of ‘their’ turn, go to some lengths to explain it away. Too much energy spent on 
internal self-differentiation as a discipline is exactly the centripetal impulse I have described. 
It does little for anthropology as a whole, and seems to contradict the more productive 
‘centrifugal’ potentialities of the larger ontological project.  
Some will sense a loss of ambition and maybe relevance since TTT’s publication over 
a decade ago. This is partly due to the retreat that TOT makes from the more controversial 
claims of the former. But it may also be because wider debates have moved on. Questions 
around the possibilities for a new humanism, (rather than ‘posthumanism’), for example, 
building on notions of uncertainty and indeterminacy (Wentzer & Mattingly 2018) seem 
more pertinent now, particularly with the rise of new kinds of right-wing politics, and a 
growing recognition of the real affects of global inequalities, privilege, precarity, austerity, 
and climate change in the context of the Anthropocene, to name only a few. All these 
factors feed a growing realisation that the ‘decolonisation’ of knowledge – an old but 
increasingly acute debate - is something which this and other versions of the ‘ontological 
turn’ must surely speak to, and yet cannot be accommodated  by simply  pushing for the 
'ontological self-determination of the worlds’ peoples'. The singularity of the one world we 
all inhabit seems harder to avoid now than ever. Even between agreeing to review The 
Ontological Turn late in 2017, and completing this review in mid 2019, something has 
changed. The ‘ontological turn is over’ one of my colleagues said to me recently, suggesting 
that the anticipation begun with the publication of Thinking Through Things in 2007 is 





1 See for example Miller’s comment: ‘To be frank, I suspect they chickened out of any direct 
identification with material culture since they were scared that the term might still have a somewhat 
lower status than mainstream social anthropology. Something which may reflect their parochialism, 
since in general I don’t think this is a fear that holds much ground these days’ 7/12/06 
http://www.materialworldblog.com/2006/12/thinking-through-things/, accessed 8/5/19. 
2 The notion of an anthropology of the subjunctive – of what ‘could be’ – has been gaining ground in 
various ways in anthropological debates recently, building on a diversity of works exploring 
uncertainty (see for example Cooper & Pratten 2015) and the excessive potentialities of materiality 
(see Fontein 2014; Pinney 2005). In September 2019 a panel entitled ‘Uncertainty in the 
Anthropocene: possibilities for a new humanism in the fourth industrial revolution’, (part of a larger 
international conference on the Fourth Industrial revolution hosted by the University of 
Johannesburg), discussed this notion in the context of an emerging critique of ‘posthumanism’ (see 
also Wentzer & Mattingly 2018; Ingold 2018; Mattingly 2018; Jackson 2018; Throop 2018). For 
another recent example, see https://www.leidenanthropologyblog.nl/articles/subjunctivity-
narratives-evidence-and-uncertainty (accessed 19/11/19); and for older discussions of the subjunctive 
in anthropology see Whyte 2002 and Good & Del Vecchio Good 1994. 
3 See Martin Holbraad’s response to Daniel Miller, 7 March 2007, 
http://www.materialworldblog.com, available here: 
http://www.materialworldblog.com/2006/12/thinking-through-things/, accessed 8/5/19. 
4 Others have used a similar kind of analogy, but I came up with this before I read these other uses 
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